

**WEEK 2 ANSWER TO QUESTION 1**  
**STEP 3.3 ASK MARK**

Hello, welcome to the second of these Ask Mark sessions. As always, we have four questions selected by the mentors and I'm going to go through them one at a time.

Here's the first question: I'm wondering if your conceptualisation of subjectivity, and hence of mind, requires a representation or modeling of the self in the brain. That is, do all minded creatures in effect inform themselves of their subjectivity, "I am a self that is having this experience", though obviously not necessarily language-mediated.

I in essence agree with this - we, all of us, living creatures to the extent where we are minded. Our mindedness depends upon a representation of our bodily state. At its absolute rudimentary level, there is a representation of the state of my own body and that is the background sentient being of the mind and it is primarily affective - not sensory, not representational, it doesn't come from the outside. So that extent, yes, I absolutely agree with the question and I think that it's important to be clearer about that because it is as I say the bedrock of what we call the mind. I would just want to be sure that we are clear though, when using the word "self", mere being in the world, doesn't necessarily include the idea of an object called "me". To be able to speak of a self requires a certain amount of reflective thinking about your states, rather than the mere having of them. And so I would just like to emphasise that this most rudimentary level of what we call mindedness, the mere subjective presence, is a representation of bodily state - what is the current state of the body that is broadcast as mere feeling - feeling of being, sentience. It doesn't necessarily have to have any ideas embedded within that sentience. Okay, so that's the first question.



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