Introduction

Critical heritage studies inevitably confront the conflict between the desire for conservation and corresponding processes of demographic elimination. In this chapter, we deploy a position of “engaged anthropology” (Herzfeld 2010) to contest persisting essentialist approaches to heritage and culture—a legacy of nineteenth-century anthropology—that still largely undergird most nationalist and other identitarian discourses and that occasionally, in their extreme form, morph into an excuse for genocide and mass destruction. The same essentialist notion of culture infuses much of the expert discourse on heritage (see, e.g., De Cesari 2010a) and renders it susceptible to political exploitation, even to the point of collusion between scholarship and exclusionary politics.

In the interests of encouraging heritage scholars to subject their own epistemic history to equally ruthless inspection, we argue for trenchantly strengthening the already ongoing re-examination of the assumptions underlying the concept of heritage itself. Such work, including explorations of equivalent terminologies elsewhere in the world, will eventually also illuminate the circumstances under which heritage becomes the victim of, and the pretext for, structural, epistemic, and physical violence against urban communities.

A further epistemological shift addresses the tendency to dichotomize heritage into “formal” and “informal” varieties (see De Cesari 2010b). We hope to reverse this tendency—which partly responds to earlier habits of ignoring whatever did not fit authorized, official, colonial, monumental, or academically respectable models of heritage (see, e.g., Byrne 2014; Harrison 2010; Meskell 2002; Smith 2006)—in favor of more nuanced and grounded distinctions.

We note the intersection of heritage violence with the resistance it engenders over spaces variously defined as domestic, collective, common, and public. Our focus is on urban heritage. Struggles over urban heritage often occur as local actors try to regroup in the face of neoliberal urbanism or other forms of discriminatory and violent spatial planning. We define neoliberal urbanism as a combination of relentless speculation...
and socio-spatial reorganization with a rapid diminution of state and municipal responsibility for social services. Resistance originates in coalitions of residents claiming their “right to the city” (Harvey 2006, 2012; Lefebvre 1968) and to their own heritage – rights, that is, occluded by processes of privatization, alienation, and monumentalization. “Urban regeneration” claims to preserve heritage while improving society. For residents and social critics alike, however, gentrification, Smith’s (2002) substitute for euphemistic talk of urban renewal (see also Jacobs 1961), is a far more apt term.

In these processes, bureaucratic and commercial forces force the enclosure of commonly enjoyed spaces and take control of domestic architecture, transforming both into gated communities and security-controlled residences (e.g., Caldeira 2001; Holston 1989). In the recent Gezi Park protests in Istanbul, state, capital, and social movements variously mobilized the concept of heritage to support competing interpretations of the past and, concomitantly, of both urban space and heritage.

Bureaucrats, business tycoons, local merchants and artisans, religious zealots, settlers, archaeologists, heritage consultants, and residents are all involved in these processes. Sometimes radically different understandings of the term “common good” underlie heritage conflicts (see Alonso González 2014; Cellamare 2008; Settis 2010, 2011, 2012). Although struggles over contested religious space usually entail a different language (e.g., Abu El-Haj 2001; Dumper 2014; Hayden 2002; Ratnagar 2004), they, too, revolve around competing interpretations of particular physical spaces and traces.

The heritagization of places (especially, but not exclusively, in nationalistic state practice) often induces radical shifts in the real estate value and social geography of heritagized neighborhoods. This articulation of heritage, commodification, and displacement has long typified both nationalistic and colonial idioms of violence. Forces variously lumped together as “neoliberal” have increasingly co-opted, expanded, and reformulated the violence of those earlier structures of power and inequality. In exploring the impact of historic conservation on the urban social fabric, we conjoin Smith’s critique of gentrification with the concept of spatial cleansing as the “social and cultural evacuation of space” (Herzfeld 2006). When urban (and occasionally rural) areas are monumentalized, local populations may be evicted either in the name of heritage or because of the insidious actions of the market with its sudden, massive increases in real estate prices and rents. Spatial cleansing is “an overall pattern whereby theme parks, partially made up of ancient materials but heavily restored and refurbished to suit modern ideas about the past, come to replace densely populated areas and in turn create growing zones of disaffected and displaced people” (Herzfeld 2006: 132). What criteria of selection determine the impact of spatial cleansing and whose interests do they serve?

It is important to avoid unnecessarily reductionist dichotomies between bad heritage (by state and capital) and good heritage (by civic committees and protest movements). Not all state interventions are necessarily misguided; many NGO-directed activities turn out to be self-serving, or, more accurately, serve the interests of neoliberal “government at a distance” (Rose and Miller 1992; see also Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Miller and Rose 2008). As several scholars have noted (e.g., Elyachar 2002; Ferguson 2010; Muehlebach 2009), there are surprising affinities between neoliberal techniques and rhetoric on the one hand and some forms of progressive politics on the other; in particular, conservative neoliberal policymakers and local activists alike mobilize the language of “community involvement” and “participation” for their respective urban heritage policies. Despite this shared language, heritage plays a growing role in both the production of, and resistance to, inequality.
The mobilization of heritage thus serves as a technique of governmentality (Foucault 1991; Miller and Rose 2008). It is deployed to control social classes variously classified as dangerous, disruptive, and embarrassingly lacking in culture. Residents often proudly enjoy those embarrassments as a form of solidarity cast as cultural intimacy (Herzfeld 2005), but their allegedly uncouth behavior too easily plays into their detractors’ hands. Moreover, the tactics of power often appropriate seemingly benign actors and concepts (especially NGOs and their rhetoric) to consolidate control over what is thereafter reconstituted as valuable real estate, historic centers, and national heritage. These tactics co-opt the symbolism of national or regional pride, and increasingly also the idiom of cosmopolitan responsibility for a universal heritage, to serve ends that clearly transcend national borders and have more to do with capital accumulation than with the symbolic importance of capital cities. They also often coincide with exclusionary policies reminiscent of earlier campaigns of spatial cleansing such as the fascist reconstructions of Italian cities under Mussolini and, perhaps most famously, Baron Haussmann’s militarization of the Paris street system in response to the 1870 Paris Commune uprising (Lamprakos 2014).

In response to such oppression, residents often also resort to heritage rhetoric. The convergence of nationalist, colonialist, municipal, and financially speculative patterns of violence with community resistance provides an important explanatory backdrop to the various “Occupy” movements. These movements have in turn reappropriated the language of “invasion,” often used by authorities as an evocative metaphor for squatting.

More recent research examines ways in which uses of heritage as place-making shift under neoliberal and transnational governmentality. In recalling the diverse social movements that have coalesced around heritage and urban sustainability, we again reject the analytical use of the informal–formal dichotomy because it is itself directly implicated in structural violence. Officials refuse recognition to the often highly regulated self-governance of the communities they contemptuously dismiss as “informal” while also concealing the lawlessness of those settlements they recognize as legal. In considering these dynamics, we will briefly illustrate them with our own work in Bangkok, Palestine/Israel, and Rome.

**Learning from Gezi Park**

In June 2013, media images of mostly youthful Turks confronting the police to defend a central city park from being built up threatened to undermine the new positive international image of Turkey, booming economically under the Islamic neoliberalism of former Istanbul mayor (and now national president) Tayyip Erdoğan. The protests, aimed at saving an urban heritage site, Gezi Park, escalated into a broadly based revolt against Erdoğan’s authoritarianism, exposing competing visions of both democracy and the past in Turkey (Bernardoni et al. 2013).

The government’s heritage project sought to replace the early twentieth-century park with a shopping mall to be housed in an on-site reconstruction of the vanished Ottoman barracks, exemplifying the vast program of neoliberal urban transformation framed in the nationalist-neo-Ottomanist rhetoric of the ruling party since 2002 (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok 2013; Nocera 2013). Characteristically sugar-coated as urban regeneration, this rhetoric offered a fusion of traditionalist religion, nostalgia for the imperial past, and unfettered market economics. It sought massive gentrification through the growing
commodification, privatization, and heritagization of the urban commons. This policy has triggered radical shifts in social geography, propelled by an alliance of local and national government with both national and transnational capital. Its visible results include the transformation of historic inner-city residential quarters into tourist sites and playgrounds for the rich and the expulsion of inhabitants of several generations’ standing (see Göktürk, Soysal, and Türeli 2010). Minority groups are especially vulnerable, and it was the resistance in Beyoğlu, historically the home of minorities and artists, that triggered the most recent protest (Nocera 2013).

In Istanbul’s periphery, slum clearance – the terminological predecessor of urban regeneration – continues unhindered, with no respect for local (if often more recent) forms of heritage, such as in the case of Ayasma (Bartu Candan and Kolluoğlu 2008). Such is the hegemonic notion of heritage now called “neo-Ottomanism” (Walton 2010), through which the AKP party promotes its project of regional hegemony through ritual enunciations of national aggrandizement, imperial rebirth, and responsible conservation. But the social movements sparked by such interventions tellingly also mobilize notions of heritage – a heritage of neighborly intimacy and multicultural urban practices.

Heritage as Possession and Dispossession

In modern nationalist thought, as Handler (1985, 1988) argues, “having a culture” – or its monumental residue – follows the logic of “possessive individualism” associated with early modern European notions of personhood. Implementing this logic, the authors of state-managed heritage have largely promoted the view of national pasts as having a timeless lien on both territory and culture, often through violent enforcement and the massive reordering of spatial functions. Nation-states – whether the nineteenth-century models or those that came after decolonization – have consequently had a deeply vested interest in promoting the conservation of carefully selected monuments. But national governments are not the only entities that claim possession in this idiom; the dispossessed often react in turn by becoming increasingly state-like in ways that require continual recalibration of the balance between resistance and complaisance.

Nation-states have been the most powerful actors in these conflicts for the past two centuries. State policies have been closely tied to questions of national identity (Smith 2004); the regulation of heritage through historic conservation often aims to reduce a fractious body politic to a single, ostensibly unified, and territorially bounded nation-state (e.g., Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Kohl 1998). This use of heritage has, not coincidentally, facilitated the bureaucratic control and regulation of people’s daily lives. For example, Herzfeld (1991), writing of the town of Rethemnos on the island of Crete, Greece, has shown how local inhabitants struggled to defend their own homes, their lived space, and “social time” from the state authorities’ tight bureaucratic control, a detemporalized past, and a monumental conception of history. While the residents eventually profited from the conservation effort – Rethemnos has weathered the Greek financial crisis of 2009–2014 in relatively good shape, in part because of its well-preserved Venetian and Ottoman domestic architecture – the predominant effect has been to flatten local historical knowledge into an encompassing national narrative.

Such anthropological studies of heritage and nationalism and the reproduction of nation-state power resonate with works published by Marxist historians in the
United Kingdom in the 1980s that were critical of the emerging “heritage industry” (Hewison 1987). Significantly, these historians pilloried the Thatcherite use of a nostalgic heritage as a key tool in the neoliberal campaign of reordering the urban environment to suit anti-welfarist policies (see also Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Wright 1985). During this phase and the subsequent increase in interest in the nationalistic uses of archaeology (e.g., Arnold 1990; Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996; Kohl and Fawcett 1995; Meskell 1998), those who resisted the national and neoliberal heritage models became more nuanced and reflexive about their own expropriation of those discourses. These periods together thus mark the paradoxical emergence of critical heritage studies from the very preoccupations that also nourished early neoliberal uses of the heritage concept. That common origin prompts the concern that, just as neoliberalism coopts the social conscience of volunteers and their organizations in order to devolve authority away from state institutions, it could too easily co-opt critical heritage discourses as a way of delegitimizing whatever obstructed its economic or ideological goals – as in Gezi Park and, in Bangkok, the threatened removal of the Pom Mahakan community (see below).

Awareness of various groups’ capacity to generate their own interpretations of the past is both a rejection of orthodox Marxist notions of false consciousness and the product of an increasing body of empirical research with affected populations (Ferguson 1996; Hayden 1995). Thus, Samuel (1994) demonstrated the Foucauldian “strategic reversibility” of the heritage discourse as a means of resistance to state control. Much subsequent work has borne out this insight, mapping out the fundamental “dissonance” and multivocality of heritage as an always-already contested terrain (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996; see also Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge 2000; Lowenthal 1996). While alternative heritages are still silenced in the name of conservation (Silverman 2012, 2013; Trouillot 1995; Whitelam 1996), local populations often adapt official historical narratives, including archaeological chronologies, to their own particular exigencies (Breglia 2006; Brown 1998; Daniel 1996; Hamilakis 2007; Kaperer 1988; Karakasidou 1993; Odermatt 1996; Stewart 2010; Sutton 1996; Watkins 2000; see also Shao 2013). These are the roots of more globalized protest movements today.

Many bureaucracies are animated by a desire to create archaeological “facts on the ground” (see Abu El-Haj 2001), a version of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness according to which material “presencing” of the past (see MacDonald 2013) could pre-empt political liens on the future. National bureaucracies assume and enhance a strict isomorphism among territory, people, and cultural heritage. Paradoxically, a similar “methodological nationalism” that takes the nation for granted as unit of analysis is also a feature of memory and heritage studies (Beck 2000; De Cesari and Rigney 2014; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).

Heritage, then, is a key locus for realizing the nation. In making and destroying heritage, people materialize ethnonational identity, sovereignty, and power claims (Baillie 2013) in ways that belie instrumentalist claims about supposedly neutral heritage (Hamilakis 2007). Often building on approaches foregrounding the centrality of material things to social and political life (Latour 2005; Miller 2005), current interventions reconfigure heritage as a deeply political process by which identities and agencies are performed, produced, and renegotiated (Herscher 2010; see also Dimova 2013). These insights, acknowledging the deep entanglement of people and things (see also Hodder 2012), illuminate the relationship between heritage and ethnic cleansing. Nationalist heritage and archaeology identify present-day populations with past traces by “telescoping” (Vansina 1985) complex histories and creating spatial contiguities
(see, e.g., Abu El-Haj 2001; Bernbeck and Pollock 1996). Conversely, destroying an enemy’s heritage (Herscher 2010) or even expropriating it (Navaro-Yashin 2009) is not the act of a prior national self but the very production of national subjectivity (see also Daniel 1996). In response, the recovery of heritage provides victims with redress, as happened with the recent mapping of destroyed Palestinian villages in Israel (Davis 2010; Khalidi 1992; Lentin 2010; Pappe 2006).2

A key element in nationalism, heritage has also played a vital role in colonialism (see Silberman 1982; Trigger 1984). Nineteenth-century imperialism entailed the theft of other people’s pasts for European collections and the selective destruction of cultural heritage in the colonies. Moreover, especially in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Greece, the search for antiquities in locations multiply viewed as “cradles of [Western] civilization” in the nineteenth and even in the twentieth century helped legitimize the colonial projects of those who claim(ed) to be the true heirs and saviors of these great civilizations (see Abu El-Haj 2001; Colla 2007; Hamilakis 2007).

Sometimes the colonizers claimed to have saved a heritage that would otherwise have gone lost thanks to the negligence of uncaring natives.3 A classic illustration is Lord Elgin’s removal of the marbles named after him, but called “the Parthenon Marbles” by Greek officials and archaeologists and still the object of an already decades-long struggle between British and Greek authorities. Greece was not formally a colony, but its crypto-colonial (Herzfeld 2002) status certainly made it relatively easy for the British to keep the marbles after Greece was created out of former Ottoman territory. Nonetheless, the locals may well have been grinding the statuary for mortar, as Elgin’s supporters claimed (Jenkyns 1980), while calls to “return” the marbles to Greece represent an antiquarian rendition of the irredentist logic that sought to bring all Greek-speaking people “back” into the Greek national territory (see Voutira 2003). The “Elgin Marbles” ironically symbolize Greece’s beholden status precisely because “returning” them continues to represent an official goal of the Greek state.

Nationalist successors to colonial powers continue many of the policies of the former occupiers in the name of national redemption. As the nationalist politics of archaeology and heritage in several postcolonial context demonstrate (see Colla 2007; De Cesari 2008; Maffi 2009), the discourse of links to ancient civilizations has been co-opted into elites’ cultural nationalism and resignified as a tool of national liberation and aggrandizement. But “the rot remains” (Stoler 2008: 200): such uses of heritage by anti- and postcolonial elites tend to reproduce the colonial legacy of race- and class-based dispossession and displacement. Such, for example, is the violence perpetrated by the Egyptian state against the villagers of Gurna next to Luxor’s Valley of the Kings. Despite their long tradition of livelihood based on closeness to the ancient ruins, they were displaced in favor of a commodified and nationalistic rendition of heritage (Meskell 2005; Mitchell 2002).

The history of heritage is thus indelibly marked by its interplay with nationalism and colonialism. A state successfully blending both projects is Israel, where Zionism harnessed heritage to the task of “returning” the Jews to their biblical homeland. Scholars such as Abu El-Haj (2001) have demonstrated Israeli archaeology’s centrality to settler colonialism (see also Ben-Yehuda 2002; Zerubavel 1995). Often allied with the military, archaeology in Israel took on key features of the older colonial science while covering its traces by obliterating the Palestinian historical presence and producing a body of material facts attesting to the ancient Israeliite
presence. This antiquarian policy gave substance to the ideological idiom of return, and, in a manner startlingly reminiscent of the Greek ideology of Hellenism, retrospectively legitimized the absorption of Palestine into the Zionist *Altneuland* (Herzl 1902) – the “old-new” Jewish state of Israel.

In analyzing the modern state’s aspiration of reordering the social world through administrative socio-spatial schemes, Scott (1998), posits two opposed rationalities and two opposed visions of the urban. One, exemplified by Le Corbusier’s top-down, functionalist, and modernist architectural philosophy, disregards – and indeed obliterates – what we might (in Scott’s terms) call organic urban heritage, that stratified and shifting, living, and locally grounded tangle of human–environment relations. To the modernist model Scott opposes the militancy that Jacobs (1961) based on the idea that this vernacular heritage was the place where creativity and urbanity truly thrive. Jacobs in turn inspires Scott’s dichotomy between the selective, simplifying, and utilitarian knowledge of *state* and *metis*, or local knowledge. Slum clearance and modernist planning have spread across the world, especially between the 1960s and the 1980s, devastating both residents’ livelihoods and their heritages. Such destruction continues, not in the name of an ordered and ordering modernity alone, but to make way for the monumental celebration of dominant groups’ visions of the past. Spatial cleansing entails “social and cultural evacuation” rather than outright destruction. A form of heritage-led urban regeneration has partly displaced modernist town planning and Hausmannesque slum clearance, while, ironically, modernist architecture is now threatened with demolition as a sign of backwardness or as a reminder of now-embarrassing pasts (as happened with socialist modernist cityscapes; see Schwenkel 2012; for neo-Prussian Berlin, see Cochrane 2013; Colomb 2012).

**Heritagization as Urban Governmentality**

Slum clearance and large-scale forced relocations accompanied by large-scale destruction of local and inhabited forms of heritage continue to take place. We have focused here on cities, but it is important to note that similar processes have also long affected rural areas (especially to make space for parks and protected conservation areas; Heatherington 2010; Kosek 2006; Meskell 2012). The proponents of both modernization and commodified heritagization are especially skeptical of local claims to be protecting heritage when that heritage only concerns the comparatively recent and largely invisible history of a currently resident community (e.g., Bartu Candan and Kolluoğlu 2008; Harms 2011). Local communities and even individual families have sometimes succeeded in stopping or slowing such processes; tactics of resistance, recalcitrance, and renegotiation can frustrate the toughest planners’ intentions (e.g., Zhang 2006, 2010). As a result, the authorities increasingly try to use their own version of heritage to combat such local interests, while wily community leaders develop great skill in identifying their local interests with wider national models of identity.

As a result of such developments, which betray underlying processes of mutual learning between what superficially seem to be implacable foes, official regulation of urban space now tends to greater subtlety. Heritagization becomes a game of mutual co-optation or a struggle to control the practical implications of governmentality. It disguises goals and practices of urban control and capital accumulation, while also reconfiguring purely local interests as common good.
Heritage has long played an important role in the consolidation of national territories. But economic globalization has intensified and distorted those older patterns. Today, turning a historic city district into heritage often causes a precipitous rise in real estate values. Furthermore, heritagization provides authorities with legal, academic, and moral tools, represented as technical and non-political forms of expertise, for intervening in people’s daily lives.

Harvey (2012) interprets the city as the new key site of capitalist accumulation and exploitation, thus repositioning struggles over the production of urban space at the heart of contemporary capitalist dynamics and class conflicts; theorists, he argues, must include “those people who produce and reproduce urban life” (Harvey 2013). In this context, capital accumulation works against homogenization by making cities unique and authentic, so as to capture capital and tourist flows. Such shifts in the frontiers of capitalism produce a new urbanism characterized by “the struggle … to accumulate marks of distinctions and collective symbolic capital in a highly competitive world” (Harvey 2012: 106). For Harvey, this process displaces and marginalizes residents who do not conform to the sanitized city culture of those in power; Laurajane Smith (2006) similarly notes how the “authorized heritage discourse” privileges the cultural symbols of the privileged classes. Heritage thus emerges as a crucial device whereby managers and developers create urban distinction and authenticity, branding cities in distinct but globalized, easily recognizable ways. Thompson’s (1979) “rubbish theory,” showing how objects hitherto regarded as valueless become collectors’ items at critical moments of scarcity, illustrates a related process dramatically demonstrated by Singapore’s relatively few surviving Chinese shophouses, once despised and neglected but now expensively beautified, gentrified, and socially decontextualized (Yeoh and Kong 1994: 30–32).

These models illustrate the political economy of heritage as added value and heritagization as a motor of capital absorption and accumulation. Anthropologically, such dynamics have been explored by John Collins (2008, 2011a, 2011b) in his analysis of the governmental restoration and patrimonialization of the historic center of Bahia, Brazil, since the early 1990s. That project has displaced over 4,000 former residents while turning the center into the capital of a sanitized and racialized Afro-Brazilian culture for global consumers. Under UNESCO’s aegis, this is an example of “capital’s novel colonization of everyday life through cultural heritage management” (Collins 2011a: 125). Collins points out the complexities of a subjectification triggered by such commodification of buildings and people through “heritage-based reifications of everyday habits as potentially alienable forms of property” (Collins 2011b: 683). In Bahia’s Pelourinho, those who did not fit the stereotype of the folkloric subject were evicted, a process legalized by the nationalization of private properties and cultural practices as heritage. Paradoxically, in Bahia a reverse privatization aids capitalization (cf. Alonso González 2014; Settis 2011). There, as in Hebron and Jerusalem (see below), heritagization emerges as a state-legitimated appropriation of land and culture. At the same time, it shapes not only people’s self-image but also their avenues of agency.

How do residents react to these phenomena? The cases we present below exemplify how social movements attempt to respond. Such movements appear local but are, in many respects, united by global logics and forces (see also Harvey 2012). Local actors can sometimes turn the tables on heritagized power plays, but their relatively weak economic and political condition usually places them at an enormous disadvantage. At times, while residents understand the violence that threatens them, they often buy into the insidious ideology of beautification according to
which an elegant, clean city benefits everyone (see Harms 2012 on Saigon). A gradually percolating and pervasive market logic ultimately obscures all but quantifiable losses; local heritage values are difficult to translate into monetary terms. Some forms of resistance are nonetheless more successful, as when residents of settlements close to a municipal railway line in Karachi, organized as a number of networked NGOs, used statist instruments such as surveys against the state itself (e.g., Hasan 2009).

A significant feature of such newly heritagized landscapes is that those involved include numerous actors of widely varying degrees of power and equally varied ideological orientations. In this complex constellation of actors and forces, allies and enemies are not always distinguishable from each other. NGOs play an important, if sometimes ambivalent, role. As the Palestinian cases discussed below demonstrate, civil society organizations are often “not as ‘NG’ [non-governmental] as they might wish us to believe” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 993). These organizations can be small, grassroots, voluntary groups organizing against state urban projects, as the case of Istanbul shows. But NGOs can be found on both sides of the hypothetical divide. Some even effectively constitute an arm of the state, and the case of Silwan’s Jewish settlers discussed below illustrates precisely this point. As examples both of government from below (or “counter-governamentality,” Appadurai 2001: 35) and of government from afar, NGOs are subject to donor pressures (Fisher 1997): this sometimes takes the form of heritage claims.

Transnational capital and supranational bodies (such as UNESCO, the World Bank, and the European Union), play a key role in reconfiguring the contours of local urban lives (see Ferguson 2006; Trouillot 2001). Cases such the parallel heritagization and gentrification of the historic center of Rome exemplify a pattern whereby various powerful actors – real estate speculators, underworld groups, local churches and confraternities, banks, and transnational capital – exploit heritage resources at the expense of local residents, sometimes with the connivance of local authorities and often under the cover of newly neoliberal legislation designed to remove such top-down brakes on runaway speculation as rent control. As a result, residents suddenly find themselves facing eviction – sometimes after several generations of relatively minor rent increases – because they cannot pay the newly inflated prices. At the same time, social movements start as local groupings, but either grow into or build upon transnational networks and alliances. Heritage has thus entered an international pattern fueled by the gradual decay or reconfiguration of the institutions of the welfare state or by forms of austerity triggered by economic crisis (De Cesari n.d.).

That non-governmental and transnational forces increasingly shape both urban and heritage outcomes is not necessarily good news. Public participation and community involvement do not necessarily determine those outcomes (see Ferguson 2010; Valverde 2011: 279). Celebrated as making heritage more democratic and accessible, participation has produced uneven effects, and has sometimes legitimated very different policy projects (McQuarrie 2013; Meskell 2012: 160; see also De Cesari n.d.; Waterton 2010; Waterton and Smith 2011). Comparing urban renewal projects carried out by resistant actors such as Hezbollah in Beirut and an alliance of slum dwellers and squatters in Mumbai, Ananya Roy (2009) analyzes the institutionalization of participation as the making of regimes of “civic governmentality” producing governable spaces and subjects. Urban governance through reform and regeneration do often blur the distinction between radical urban citizenship projects and novel configurations of governmentality.
Governments and municipalities use heritage to connive in the dispossession of a growing part of the urban population worldwide (for a survey of urban heritage, see Ruggles 2012). Pioneering work in countries such as South Africa reveals the ways in which urban heritage planning still produces injustice and exclusion (Meskell 2012; Weiss 2014). While the arts of the poor and their survival tactics are celebrated as a way out of poverty and a model of entrepreneurship in times of crisis (Elyachar 2002, 2012), informal settlements and their heritage are rapidly being destroyed while their populations are relocated to inhospitable spaces (see also Nakamura 2014).

The idea of the informal settlement itself serves as a justification for urban planners bent on projects of land grab, forced relocation, and heritage destruction. A paradigmatic case is the demolition of “illegal” Palestinian buildings by Israeli authorities that are themselves illegal, at least according to international law, and that constantly deny building permits to their occupied subjects. Such is the operational logic that guides contemporary planning processes. Recent scholarship on slums oscillates between two different positions. Some writings mark informality in celebratory fashion as a “way of life” (AlSayyad 2004) and the “habitus of the dispossessed” (Bayat 2007: 579), and thus as a site of social and cultural creativity. Certainly, much “heritage” is also unrecognized where states have imposed regimes of “transience” such as refugee camps (Malkki 1992; Sayigh 2007). Critical scholars, however, emphasize instead the necessity of recognizing the discriminatory character of planning that rests on the formal–informal dichotomy (notably Roy 2012). Not only are the “formal” and the “informal” deeply entangled, but “informality” itself may constitute a key technology of colonial, crypto-colonial, and postcolonial governance (Gupta 2013; Herzfeld n.d.; Hull 2012). Until planners can recognize the extraordinary capacity of many slum dwellers for generating the formal rules of community management, these two groups of people will continue to talk past each other, more and more forms of heritage will disappear forever, and the lives of the urban poor will become increasingly precarious. Generous recognition of slum dwellers’ capacity for effective self-governance would, conversely, favor greater security for all. Indeed, housing shortages, often created by monopolistic abuses of the heritage concept, may pose the greatest current threat to global security.

Redevelopment and renewal projects across the world allegedly bring millions in investments and community benefits to degraded, de-developed post-industrial neighborhoods. Heritagization is promoted by local governments and other actors as a way out of de-industrialization and as offering the possibility of a new life for what are held to be urban wastelands (Harrison 2013). But how can such so-called development be viewed as reviving old neighborhoods if the society itself is either evicted in its entirety or regulated out of any possibility of engagement in the mapping of future trajectories?

What is being erased, cleansed in the name of heritage, has at least as much of a claim on the name of heritage as what supersedes it. Heritage without people serves only privileged and often absent elites. A neighborhood exists, not simply as a space on a map, but as the site of complex social and human–environment relationships (Appadurai 2001). Such social entities, which are often of considerable age and historical interest, are too tied to particular spatial configurations to survive the destruction of their built environments. The consequence of eviction is social evisceration – the destruction of a heritage in which the wealthy rarely have any interest, other, perhaps, than a prurient nostalgia.
There is something tragically ironic about this process. It is the world of familiar spaces that people struggle to preserve, even though they may frame that struggle in official-sounding language. While some communities are riven by disputes about whether to accept compensation or to defend their ground, as has happened in the famous Bon Pastor neighborhood of low-cost workers’ housing in Barcelona (Lawrence-Zuniga 2012), the fact that the choice occasions such bitter dispute suggests that many actors have cultural reasons – often framed as affect – for staying put. By what logic are those reasons excluded from the category of heritage?

The growing drive to heritagize the urban environment recalls Renato Rosaldo’s (1989: 108) formulation of “imperialist nostalgia” as something “often found under imperialism, where people mourn the passing of what they themselves have transformed … [It] uses a pose of ‘innocent yearning’ both to capture people’s imaginations and to conceal its complicity with often brutal domination” (for acts of conservation-cum-destruction, see also Rabinow 1989 on the “liberal” conservation of Muslim religious architecture by French colonial planners). More generally, nostalgia of any kind is often the expression of inequality (Hill 1992) or loss (Boym 2001; Dimova 2013). When it comes to the lived urban environment, some can afford nostalgia; many others, their lives wrecked by new regimes of precariousness, cannot.

Dispossession and Resistance by Heritage I: Palestine/Israel

Outside the Old City of Jerusalem, parts of the occupied Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan/Wadi Hilwah were recently expropriated and “redeveloped” into an archaeological park-cum-Jewish colony, the City of David. Despite rich archaeological findings dating from prehistory until the early Islamic period and later, only the biblical past is presented. The Israeli parks authority has subcontracted the management of the park to an NGO called Ir David Foundation (commonly abbreviated as El-Ad), a militant group close to the ultranationalist-religious Israeli settlers’ movement. Founded by a former commander of an elite military unit, El-Ad is committed to the “preservation and development of the Biblical City of David and its environs,” a mission that includes “residential revitalization” – in short, colonization. Daily lives go on unobtrusively amidst the manicured ruins of the park: a Palestinian elderly lady making her way home with her groceries or roaming settlers’ children point to the literal presence of the political present in the past. Some residents of the park are more and some are definitely less happy about living with archaeology; some are citizens, others are subjects (see Mamdani 1996), depending on their ethnonational community and their closeness to the version of the biblical past promoted on the site. Along the winding central road, prominent signs bear the biblical harp of David and point to “the house of Netzer” and other biblical personages. These are not archaeological remains but the homes of present-day Jewish settlers, for whom settlement of the Holy Land is a religious-nationalist mission; they are built in neo-biblical style to blend in with the heritagized environment (Pullan and Gwiazda 2009). The land upon which the park and the new settlers’ homes are built has been either expropriated or acquired through contested compulsory purchases from Palestinians, forcing many to leave their ancestral neighborhood.

In Wadi Hilwah/City of David a monolithic and exclusivist narrative of the past has been mobilized to displace Palestinians and their living heritage and urban world in favor of the new settlers. Such is the destructive potential of archaeology: excavation
areas in the park encroach upon and besiege Palestinian homes, some of which have partly collapsed because of digging conducted beneath them. Exposed to settlers, border police violence, and the constant threat of demolition or expropriation, the remaining Palestinian residents are forced to live a subjugated and less than urban life in a heavily securitized neo-biblical landscape of ruins and fences, tourists and watchtowers, settlers and CCTV cameras – a landscape no longer their own. Even the name of the main street has been changed from Wadi Hilwah Street into “City of David Ascent.”

At the City of David, “securitization goes hand in hand with privatization as a mechanism of control over movement within the park and settlement” (Pullan and Gwiazda 2009: 35). The land is close to the most expensive real estate in Jerusalem; heritagization has contributed to the skyrocketing property values (see Ricca 2007). Created in 1986, El-Ad now owns the majority of the lands of the park, and is expanding it. It has achieved all this thanks to the direct and indirect support of several state institutions and agencies. For example, after decades of neglect of the Palestinian neighborhood, the Israeli-run municipality started a project of “regeneration” incorporating, and thus privatizing, several formerly public Palestinian areas for the settlers. Visitors are thus drawn into complicity with this ongoing process of dispossession and expropriation.

The case of the City of David is not an exception but reproduces a pattern critical to the workings of the Israeli nationalist-colonial project: a form of spatial cleansing that borders on ethnic cleansing. Since the early years of the state, archaeology has played a key function in the Israeli state-building process: it has legitimized colonization by producing the material evidence of the ancient land of Israel, thus substantiating the ideology of return (Abu El-Haj 2001). Here, heritagization works on two levels. Ideologically, archaeology produces spatiotemporal continuity – the past made into an affective and effective present so evidently at work at the City of David – so that Palestinian lands are judaized (Benvenisti 2000; Yiftachel 2012) and absorbed into the national territory. For settlers, this signifies living rightfully on the occupied land: “This is not just a stone; this wall is not just a wall … I feel King David’s hand as I put my hand on this stone” (El-Ad spokesperson Doron Spilman, quoted in Greenberg 2009: 43). “Feeling” recurs in responses to the material traces of the past, so that “hundreds of Jewish residents live in the City of David and help form the inspiring new mosaic of the return of the Jewish People to their homeland and eternal capital – Jerusalem” (quoted in Greenberg 2009: 42).

Moreover, such projects turn heritage into a technical means of appropriation. As in the case of Bahia, land grab by heritage (B’Tselem 2002; Weizman 2007) passes through the “nationalization of once privately held properties, ostensibly for the benefit of all” (Collins 2011a: 123), with the state “reclassify[ing] privately owned or incompletely registered lands … as cultural possessions of a collectivity” (124). Unfortunately for Jerusalem’s Palestinians, this collectivity does not include them, and their homes and livelihoods – their urban social worlds – are wrecked in the process now known as “urbicide” (see Campbell, Graham, and Monk 2007).

Oddly, the park is not managed by the Israeli national park authority but by an alleged NGO. The state itself, protected from being the immediate agent of violence and dispossession, provides, in part through excavations conducted by the Israel Antiquities Authority, the legal and material infrastructure for El-Ad, while harnessing its benefits after the fact (see Weizman 2014). At the time of this writing, demolition orders have been given for eight Palestinian structures around a plot slated by the Israeli-run municipality to become the new extension of the City of
David. (The municipality considers these Palestinian homes illegal because they are built without its permits; these demolition orders, however, should be read against the fact that, since the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, the municipality has not awarded Silwan’s Palestinian residents a single building permit.) By thus arbitrarily drawing the line between urban formality and informality, and between heritage and non-heritage, both the local and the national governments, operating within a deeply contested legality, unilaterally set the legal boundaries to their advantage.

In places such as Silwan/the City of David, where the moral and affective force of nationalism and the past are mobilized to efface a brutal colonial reality, heritage emerges as the site of a two-sided dialectic. Colonial ruins may turn into “epicenters of renewed claims … history in a spirited voice … sites that animate new possibilities, bids for entitlement, and unexpected political projects” (Stoler 2008: 198). The City of David has become a symbol of non-violent Palestinian resistance against the occupation — even if it has not proved successful — as well as the trigger of some friction within Israeli society thanks to the protest of a small but vocal group of archaeologists, appalled by such misuse of their discipline (they have created an activist organization, Emek Shaveh, which organizes critical tours of the site and regularly publishes updates on its website).

As a counterpoint next to the entrance of the City of David, there is a small stone building covered by a ramshackle roof where a large sign announces the “Wadi Hilwah Information Center – Silwan.” The purpose of the center, run by local residents, is to inform people about human rights violations in Silwan and to “ask the people of Israel and the world to support their struggle for the right to live in their village as part of a multi-cultural Jerusalem based on principles of equality and peace.” The organization has its own active website that publishes news updates about human rights abuses in the territories, with a special focus on the travails — frequent arrests, home demolitions, and settlers’ use of archaeology as a tool of dispossession — of Jerusalemites. The center’s website presentation points straight at the politics of heritage:

We … do not allow any person to obscure our deep rooted identity which lies in the houses, stones, trees, gardens, springs, and sky of our village [Silwan] … We are proud of the full history of our village and proud of being the owners of this beautiful legacy. We acknowledge all the civilizations that have passed through the village, those who constructed the village or even those who destroyed it and wreaked havoc.

A similar dialectics of dispossession and resistance through heritage has been unfolding in the Old City of Hebron, the most populous West Bank city after Jerusalem. Hebron is a key historic and religious site, with its traditional Arab-Islamic architecture built around the city’s important shrine, the Haram Ibrahimi or Tomb of the Patriarchs, sacred to both Jews and Muslims because it is believed to house the tombs of several biblical patriarchs, including Abraham, the father of both faiths. Since the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, groups of radical religious-nationalist Jewish settlers have occupied a number of buildings throughout the Old City, close to the shrine. For settlers, the Tomb of the Patriarchs is the strongest evidence of their right to the city. As David Wilder, spokesperson for the new Jewish community of Hebron, said in a recent interview:

People [settlers] who live here [in Old Hebron] of course live here for ideological reasons … Keep in mind that the Tomb of the Patriarchs down the street is the second holiest site
for the Jewish people in all the world. So, this is all Jewish land. When I came back here, I did not come back here to conquer and occupy foreign land. I came home. I came back to where Jews had lived.13

For settlers, archaeology in its very materiality speaks of their roots in the city and the rightfulness of their presence. Inhabiting the archaeological remains and the Jewish heritage of Hebron and “revitalizing” them through ritual practices, pilgrimages, and festivals transform colonization into the repossession of ancestral lands.

Once again supported by the overwhelming power of the Israeli state, settlers’ assertion of their right to the city dispossessed local Palestinians of both homes and heritage and triggered the militarization and segregation of the Old City. Economic life has ceased with the occupation of key urban nodes such as the vegetable market and the bus station and with the closing of the majority of the local stores (B’Tselem 2007); the targets of systemic violence, especially middle-class Palestinians have left the Old City, their number dropping from over 7,500 before 1967 to approximately 400 in the early 1990s. Here, too, heritage provides an example of the strategic reversibility of power since it became the platform for a Palestinian counter-settlement project.

At the time of the Oslo Agreements in 1994, a group of local politicians, architects, and activists created a committee to restore the Old City and to bring Palestinians back to live in the restored old houses so as not to leave them abandoned and thus prey to occupation by the settlers. They set in place the Hebron Rehabilitation Committee (HRC). This organization was clearly the product of the Palestinian strategy at the time, combining negotiations with different forms of resistance designed to strengthen their negotiating position; over the years, however, it turned into something different. The winner of several architectural and heritage prizes – proud to be connected to international heritage expert networks and to speak the language of scientific heritage – HRC continues to work toward the restoration and rehabilitation of Hebron’s decaying historic buildings and toward improving the livelihoods of resident Palestinians. By 2013 it had brought back over 6,000 Palestinians to live in the Old City, where gradually, especially in recent years, stores have been reopening and an appearance of normalcy is returning.

Colonization in Hebron continues, but at a slower pace. HRC’s focus was at first exclusively on restoring houses in order to stop settlement expansion, but it subsequently moved to a much broader approach targeting the “development” and “revitalization” of the Old City, a mission that includes running a number of socioeconomic development initiatives and a legal center to monitor settlers’ violation of human rights, as well as preparing the heritage and tourism master plan for the whole city. In the absence of state structures, and in an area under Israeli military control, this organization has come to run the administration of the Old City in the manner of a department of the municipality, receiving millions of dollars from European and Arab donors (De Cesari 2011). Recently, HRC has begun to prepare the nomination of Hebron’s Old City for the World Heritage List, a move that is also intended to strengthen Palestinian claims to local territorial sovereignty.

Similar organizations and initiatives across the West Bank have carried out numerous urban regeneration projects, targeting the restoration and social reuse of the local vernacular architecture (De Cesari 2010b, n.d.). The Israeli occupation has profoundly shaped these heritage projects, all of which fundamentally aim to preserve what Palestinian intellectual and activist Raja Shehadeh (2007) has called a “vanishing landscape,” a heritage-rich fabric of human–environment interactions.
In Palestine/Israel, heritage is thus mobilized to transform contested lands and to claim sovereignty and control.

**Dispossession and Resistance by Heritage II: Pom Mahakan**

The case of Pom Mahakan in Bangkok, Thailand, already well documented (see Herzfeld 2003, 2006, 2013), offers instructive parallels and contrasts. A community of roughly three hundred inhabitants has resisted attempts by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) to evict the entire group from its dwelling area. Over a period of nearly 23 years at the time of writing, the community has played a cat-and-mouse game with the bureaucrats in the courts; engaged the bureaucrats’ own tactics of playing for time; faced a possibly violent army onslaught, mostly deflected, on its homes; and developed a rich language of heritage in order to counter the authorities’ attacks on its legitimacy with an assumption of expertise and especially of “local knowledge” – this last blazoned on a very official-looking shingle announcing the main function of the rather makeshift community resource museum. Brown and white signs marking items of historical interest at various points in the very small space occupied by the community significantly mimic the style of the official signage outside.

Most community members are fairly recent arrivals; only three families can trace any connection to the original royal settlement of bureaucrats. But that diversity of origins has itself allowed the leaders to claim a part in Thailand’s much-vaunted regional diversity. At the same time, the predominantly royalist tone of the leaders’ pronouncements about heritage provide a means of suggesting that attacks on the community represent attacks on the very essence of what it means to be Thai. This is especially true of the community’s frequent attempts to historicize its vernacular architecture in terms of the reigns of various kings of the present dynasty – a suggestive irony when one considers that one of the persistent complaints about heritage conservation in Thailand is precisely that it fails to respect vernacular traditions (see especially Askew 1996). One of the leaders, asked whether this use of an official discourse might not be identifying the community too closely with the political tradition of the state, showed in his response that he thought that the strategy was working, that the community had no other choice, but that the residents were aware of the dangers of tying their identity too closely to a single narrative. In what he said, there was a further implication, probably dampened by prevailing fears of discussing sensitive political issues: since the threatened eviction was supposed to make way for a park in honor of the Thai queen, only a resolutely royalist stance could work.

Communities in such situations have limited choices. Legally the majority of the residents were considered to be squatters; it is significant that, whereas the BMA accused them of “invading” (*buk luk*) the space, they retorted that it was the BMA that was “invading.” (This reciprocal use of insults is characteristic; when BMA officials called them “obstinate” [*doea*], they used the same epithet in response.) Their vision more generally mirrors that of the authorities; they are technically outside the old city wall and of the fortress from which they draw their name, but from their perspective it is the bustling modern city that lies outside their “historical” space – a space from which, in their view, the bureaucrats have alienated themselves by refusing to recognize their value as a “historic” community. In a word, they have taken the official model of historicity and made it their
own—to the point, moreover, of treating the various family spirit shrines as shrines to the ancestors of the Thai people in general.

The bureaucrats’ plan replaces the community with an empty lawn; this unpeopled vision of heritage was confirmed by a court decision asserting that a “public park,” as the space is intended to become, could not contain private houses. Such self-serving logic leads local activists to comment that it is the law, not the community’s perspective, that needs fixing. More to the immediate point, it occludes what used to be a crucial part of the Thai national doctrine—that the people, along with the monarchy and the Buddhist religion, were the core of Thainess—in favor of what the planners clearly hope will provided a “civilized” space: a lawn surrounded by a formal white balustrade. Rumors that a MacDonald’s would be built on the site proved untrue, or at least premature, but they indicate that the battle lines were being drawn between local community interests and a transnational economic system that demanded immediate profit in a “free” market.

The story of Pom Mahakan is still playing out. The fact that the majority of the residents have remained on the site suggests that the strategy of absorbing and rebroadcasting the rhetoric of monarchical Thainess has served the community well thus far; whether it will continue to do so is unclear and will depend on future political developments at the national level, but also on the leaders’ capacity for negotiation in a conflictual space—they are very proud of having escaped serious difficulties as a result of the recent Red–Yellow Shirt confrontations, both factions being represented in the community in an exemplary display of peaceful co-existence.

As with the Palestinian cases, the Pom Mahakan situation partly revolves around conflicting interpretations of law. But here the question of national sovereignty is not at stake. Rather, the underlying issues concern the content of national culture and the extent to which the rule of law guarantees indisputably ethnic Thais the right to decent habitation and permits them to advance an alternative vision—however partial, given current political tensions—of what it means to be Thai and of who should have the responsibility for curating such a potentially important heritage site. As in the Palestinian cases, too, conflicting interpretations of heritage serve the aims of disputants to a territorial conflict; but this territory is important, not because its ultimate national identity is at stake, but because it is used to represent in miniature two conflicting visions of the past and future of the Thai national polity. Heritage discourse can feed interethnic and intranational conflict alike; the reversibility of the “authorized” power play is common to both situations.

Dispossession and Resistance by Heritage III: Rome

The Palestinian and Thai cases both suggest that ethnicized conflict can give the oppressed some chance of at least partial success. That is much more difficult to achieve when conflict involves unclear class distinctions in an otherwise peaceful cultural setting. Especially when residents are renters rather than owners (see also Caftanzoglou 2001 on Athens; cf. Herzfeld 1991), the chances of success are slight. In the Monti district of Rome, one of the last working-class areas in the center of the city, the sheer multiplicity of powerful players and the weakness of divided local communities representing polarizations to left and right have, in combination with the “liberalization” (i.e., abolition) of rent control sapped the capacity of economically weak merchants and artisans (Herzfeld 2009). These residents, lacking collateral, are also unable to borrow funds—except from unscrupulous loan-sharks—to stand
against banks, churches, property speculators, and real-estate developers, especially once the formerly despised buildings are reconceptualized as historic. This is a classic clash of the opposed ethical imperatives of the right to housing and the protection of architectural and other forms of heritage, and offers a contrast with the convergence of these concerns in the Pakistani, Palestinian, and Thai cases mentioned here. Imposing palazzi, once home to numerous local families but latterly allowed to decay in the hope that rats and peeling walls would force the residents out, are now advertised on line as desirable and expensively furnished rentals, much as the old hutong in Beijing have been displaced by newer structures offering a supposedly authentic (but anachronistic) experience with conveniences that were never part of the cramped local living conditions.  

Pressures to leave are violent expressions of the standoff between neoliberal and state forces on the one hand and resisting residents, often defined as illegal squatters, on the other. Such pressures include menacing nocturnal telephone calls, cruel enactments of fitting inhabited spaces to new requirements once the present residents have been forced out, and, above all, the use of neglect and – more actively – fires that are far from accidental. Force may be met with force, as Chance (forthcoming) has documented for the reciprocal use of fire in South Africa, while legal delaying tactics are not uniquely the privilege of the powerful. But residents usually have less access to both material and legal resources, so the contest is usually an uneven one. The evidence lies in outcomes around the world. 

The violence thus described is a common prelude to spatial cleansing. Fire empties vast spaces and leaves them at the developers’ mercy. Neglect that makes habitation untenable achieves the same effect more slowly; ironically, the accumulation of refuse sometimes accelerates the process of spatial cleansing. 

The case studies described here show the enormous variety of patterns in the clash between housing and heritage. As anthropological research reveals ever more complex nuance in the invocation of heritage on all sides of such conflicts, especially when these conflicts pit local communities against nationalistic, colonial, and neoliberal juggernauts, the need for a critical examination of heritage discourses, and especially of the politics of the supposedly apolitical forms of relevant expertise, becomes ever more urgent. That examination must be based, as we have suggested here, on the ethnographic exploration of local specificities. To do otherwise is to yield to the generalizing logic and destructive simplification that together now constitute the greatest threats to the survival of cultural diversity as a resource for humanity’s future.

NOTES

1 The authors wish to express their gratitude to Sophie van den Elzen for her efficient help in tidying up the bibliography and citations in the final phase of compilation. We also thank Lynn Meskell for presciently proposing our collaboration and for her patience with us as we communicated across five different countries.


3 The imperialist discourse of antiquities is still alive and well today, especially in the rhetoric of those of the museum establishment opposed to the repatriation of colonial spolia; they advance the argument that the “West” has saved these spolia from secure destruction (see Cuno 2008). Also in these modern cases, the argument that natives do not care for sites well enough is being used to dispossess rightful owners of their heritage.
A related case that has not, to our knowledge, being analyzed thus far in terms of erasure of heritage is that of Roma communities being the target of racist violence by both states and citizens, as well as of ongoing evictions across European countries (on the European Roma and memory, see van Baar 2011; see also Nationalities Blog, http://nationalities.wordpress.com/2010/09/26/huub-van-baar-expulsion-fever-in-europe-the-case-of-the-roma/, accessed November 20, 2014).


See also Non Arkaraprasertkul (2013) for a comparable perspective on gentrification in Shanghai.

REFERENCES


Byrne, K. (forthcoming) “Where there is fire, there is politics”: Governance and ungovernability in urban South Africa. Cultural Anthropology.


Chance, K. (forthcoming) “Where there is fire, there is politics”: Governance and ungovernability in urban South Africa. Cultural Anthropology.


